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Abstract— Modern services request personal information from
their customers. The personal information is not needed only
for identifying the customer but also for customising the service
for each customer. In this paper we first analyse the existing
approaches for personal information handling and point out
their weaknesses. We desribe an architecture for the delivery
of personal information from the customer to the HTTP based
service in the Internet. For personal information storing our
architecture relies on a mobile device, such as a customer’s mobile
phone. The access of the service is conducted with a traditional
desktop computer. The information is transmitted to the service
on request via a desktop computer that fetches the information
from a mobile device over a wireless link.
The goal of our approach is to simplify the use of services
by helping the customer to provide the required personal infor-
mation. Furthermore our approach is designed so that existing
services require only minor changes. We introduce methods for
the customer to control his own privacy by providing notation
to define the required security measures for automated data
transfer. Finally we discuss the possible security risks of our
architecture.
Index Terms— personal information, usability, Internet service,
personal trusted device, privacy, service, bluetooth.
I. INTRODUCTION
John manages to publish a paper in a conference and now he
has to arrange his trip to the conference. First he connects to the
conference website and registers himself as a conference presenter.
In the registration process he types in his personal information e.g.
name, address, and phone number. After the conference registration
he connects to the airline web page and reserves plane tickets to
the conference. Again, he has to type in the same set of personal
information. A similar procedure is repeated when John reserves a
hotel room and orders the proceedings of the previous conference
from the online bookstore.
The example above presents a typical case where services
request information about the users of the service. In addition
to personal information also the wishes, preferences or needs
of the users are often queried by the web-sites. This gathered
information, so called user profile, is then used for identifying
the user as well as for personalising the content of the page
like in the web based bookstore Amazon.com. According to
LaRose et al. [1] , the information collected by web based
services typically includes last name, credit card number,
demographics, telephone number, street address etc., which
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are all very private and can be used to identify the user.
Similar results are presented by Heikkinen et al. [2] in their
survey of over 100 websites offering personalised services.
According to their research, most of the websites required
personal information similar to the example above. The use of
Internet services leads to a situation where the user has several
different profiles in the web [3]. Although the information is
gathered for personalisation purposes, the user centricity is
decreased as the user is confused by what data each of the
services holds in their user profiles.
In this paper we base our work on the fact that services
request and use personal information and users provide this
information to the services. We take a user-centric approach to
the personal information management problem as we believe
that the user should have ownership of his/her own profile
data. We see that the data should be stored locally as the
local storage is fundamentally more private. Therefore, in our
approach the data containing personal information is stored
at the user’s personal trusted device, e.g. mobile phone. We
present an architecture that uses this local profile storage in
HTTP based services.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2
considers the personal information and the location where
it should be stored. This chapter also contains some related
work from the field of our research. Chapter 3 describes the
general architecture of our mobile device based approach.
Chapter 4 discusses the personal information, its handling
and the methods used to protect privacy. Chapter 5 describes
the communication of different pieces of the architecture and
shows how the architecture operates. In chapter 6 we go
briefly through the potential attacks against our system. Finally
chapter 7 concludes the paper and discusses future research.
II. PERSONAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
The term personal information can be interpreted in several
ways. In personal information management (PIM), personal
information means information that is owned by the user, e.g.
to-do list, calendar notes or phone numbers. The personal
information required for the personalisation of services is
information about the given person such as name, address and
different kinds of preferences. The latter is what we consider
personal information in this paper. In [4] personal information
is shortly analysed and then divided into user profile and
identities according to the view point. If we are looking at
the personal information from the user-centric point of view
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then we should talk about identities rather than user profiles
collected by the services. Although the user-centricity is the
main goal of our research, we use the general term personal
information in this paper.
In our research the more important issue, than exact content
of the personal information, is the management of the data.
We have taken the existing approaches as the base for our
work and propose an approach that combines the best parts of
each approach. Figure 1 presents all these approaches, namely
1) registration, 2) database at network, 3) browser and 4) PTD
based approaches. The existing approaches 1) - 3) are shortly
introduced in this chapter and motivation for our approach is
given.
Fig. 1. Different locations for personal information
Many of the current Internet services utilize the registration
approach. Users have to register for the service before they
can start using it. The service stores the information about
the customers, i.e. user profile, into its database for further
usage. Thus next time the user accesses the same service he
doesn’t have to provide the same information again. Instead,
the service looks up the user profile from its database. In order
to find the correct personal information from the database a
user authentication is required. Besides the basic identifying
information, services may request the user’s preferences, fol-
low the user’s behaviour on the server and store the gathered
information into an appropriate database. The stored infor-
mation is then used to personalise the service i.e. adapt the
service outlook and content into a more customer friendly
form. Effective personalisation will provide better customer
satisfaction and thus increase the customer’s loyalty towards
the service [5], [6]. Effective personalisation also requires a lot
more information about the customer than just simple contact
data.
However, the service database is not always the most
optimal place for the information as claimed in [7]. As the
variety of the used services grows, the places to where the
user has to provide his personal information grow and the
confusion about the contents of the user profiles increases.
If the information needs to be changed the user needs to
know all the places where the information is stored. It is
unlikely that the user remembers all these places thus resulting
in contradictory information. Another problem arises when
considering the security of the personal information. When
the information is stored in the service database, the user
has to trust that the service provider is capable of storing the
information securely enough. The more services the user uses,
the bigger is the chance that one of them has weaknesses in
their security system. To minimise the amount of databases
the personal information is stored in, the customer can easily
decide to concentrate on to only few service providers.
A second possibility is to store the personal information
in a single database on the network. This database can be
administrated by a trusted third party or the customer. Some of
the single sign-on (SSO) approaches such as Microsoft .NET
passport [8] and Liberty Alliance [9] can be used to provide a
third party based solution for the personal information storage
problem. However, originally the .NET passport required the
service provider to pay a fee to Microsoft. This meant that
small service providers could not afford to adopt the passport.
It is also unlikely that temporary services like conference
registrations are willing to do the extra work required to join
in the SSO system especially when all they need is simple
registration information for a one time event.
In Liberty architecture, service and identity providers form
circles of trust in which the participants transfer information
about the user. The creation of a circle of trust requires
negotiations between the participating partners. Like in the
.NET passport this is unsuitable for one time services provided
by small service providers. In these approaches the user has
to trust the third party and that the third party uses secure
methods when handling the user’s sensitive data. Also the
trusted party has to be the same party for both user and
service provider. If there are several third parties providing
similar personal profiles, the service provider has to have
a contract with most of them, in order to not exclude any
users. Obviously, information stored on third party servers, is
available only when a connection can be formed between the
service provider and the servers. Thus the use of the service
relies not only on the reliability of the network between the
customer and service but also the network between service
and the third party. This problem is graver in countries that
have poor international Internet connections. Finally, the third
party service may change the way it functions and the terms
of use. For example Microsoft has stated that they will cease
to offer passport functionality outside their own services. In
Microsoft and Liberty approaches the user has no control over
his/her profile, which is a serious drawback.
Other centralized approaches have been proposed. Koch
proposes IDRepository that allows users to own their own
profiles [10]. At the same time this approach supports com-
plex user profile attributes. In the Wireless World Research
Forums (WWRF) book of visions Bettstetter et al. suggested
a user controlled personal profile server [11]. A more detailed
solution was described by Thai et al. [12]. Their Integrated
Personal Mobility Architecture relied on the customer’s home
network as a location to store personal information. Compared
to third party approaches the user controlled database is easier
for service providers since they don’t have to have contracts
with different third parties. The data is available for services
when the profile server is up and running. A security conscious
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user will turn the service on only when needed, thus increasing
security.
The third obvious location for the personal information
storage is at the user end. New web browsers have the
capability to store some information for the user. Thus, the
information is stored in the place, from where it is easiest to
use and update. There exist two approaches that can be used to
determine what information will be filled in an empty form.
In the first approach the stored information depends on the
web page. The browser remembers what the user has typed
into the form fields, when the form was filled in before. In the
second approach the web page supports the browser’s personal
information scheme, so that the browser itself can determine
what information is given in what field [13]. Although the
web browsers will enhance this personal information storage
functionality rapidly, it does not help the mobile or nomadic
users. Mobile and nomadic users typically access the services
from several different terminals at different places.
All the aforementioned approaches have problems in in-
formation access, security and management issues. Although
offering personalised services whenever accessible, the service
database approach suffers from security and management
issues. The biggest challenge is in keeping the information
coherent on different services. The trusted third party approach
offers coherence but suffers from the access issue. It is possible
that the user may connect to the service but the trusted third
party is non-accessible. Accessibility is further improved by
the use of a browser based approach. With this approach
the personal information is accessible and updatable if the
same browser or computer is used all the time. Unfortunately,
this type of local information approach does not support
nomadic users. To overcome these problems we have devel-
oped an approach where personal information is stored in the
customer’s mobile device. The personal information can be
requested from there by the service either directly or via the
service accessing device e.g. the desktop computer. In this
approach the personal data is under the customer’s control
i.e. the customer always can access the data and can define
who is allowed to fetch the data automatically. The data
is available for the service when the customer is using the
service. Therefore the service does not have to store all the
data in its database.
Similar approaches have been proposed by many re-
searchers. The EU funded Simplicity project [14] concentrates
on the use of services through different terminals and devices.
In order to provide seamless usage of services in different
devices the Simplicity project proposes the use of a so called
Simplicity device to store the user profile. Although several
possibilities for the storage are given they conclude that the
SIM + smart phone combination is not very far from the ideal
storage and processing device. Thus from this point of view
the Simplicity project is quite close to our approach. Riche et
al. proposes in [3] a distributed client side approach where the
user profiles are stored in several user devices. Each device
can store a part of the profile. Although the approach is very
intuitive as the user often uses a limited number of devices,
the challenge is in the synchronization of the profile data, as
seen in the paper. This concept is out of the scope of this
paper as we consider only a single device as the storage for
personal information.
III. PTD BASED APPROACH
In this paper we present an approach that supports nomadic
users and offers manageable, accessible and private storage of
personal information. In our approach the personal information
is stored in a single personal mobile device, i.e. Personal
Trusted Device (PTD). The Personal trusted device term is
used in many places. In electronic commerce/banking the per-
sonal trusted device means mainly a device that offers strong
authentication of the user for the services [15]. Although
authentication is important in some cases, it is not the main
issue in our approach. Security issues of the PTD are also
emphasized in the presentations of [16], [17]. In [17] the PTD
is defined with the more extensive scope in mind, but the
discussion is mainly on the security and privacy level. In our
approach the definition and the purpose of PTD is more on the
use of services through the PTD than on the security issues
of the communication. Security issues are important, but they
are only a part of the bigger scope of the PTD approach.
For us personal means that the device is used only by one
person: the owner of the device. This means that that person
can trust that the device holds the right information and it is
not tampered. The device has its own authentication method
to verify that the owner of the device is handling it. PTD may
be used for authentication purposes but it can also be used to
enable anonymous personalisation of the service [18]. For us,
PTD is a device that is carried around almost at any time and
any place and it is used in local (personal area networking,
local area networking) and in global communications. PTD is
the centre or the hub of all personal communication the user
wishes to perform. Our concept of the personal trusted device
in personal communications is further explained in [19].
Fig. 2. PTD and ME in service access
PTD can be used in several different situations. Figure 2
presents example cases where PTD can be used as a part of
the service access. In a) and b) the services are used through
the PTD whereas in c) PTD is just a complementary part of
the service access. The actual access to the service in c) is
conducted via a fixed terminal such as a desktop computer. In
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this paper we concentrate on case c). Approach a) is presented





















Fig. 3. Architecture of ME - service
The concept of PTD can be further expanded by considering
PTD as personal information storage, as was done in [20].
The idea of PTD, e.g. mobile phones, is that it stays with
the user all the time and thus the information stored in it can
be accessed and used whenever necessary. In [20] a separate
service, i.e. mobile electronic personality - ME, for personal
information handling was defined. ME itself is a part of PTD
as presented in Figure 2.
The ME service (presented in Figure 3), consists of two
databases and a security agent. All the personal information is
stored in the personal information database while information
about the services and their authentication credentials are
stored in the service definitions database. The security agent
handles the requests of personal information. Before any piece
of data is sent, there is a check to determine whether the
requester has rights to the information [20].
Information confidentiality definition


















SAD = Service Accessing device
PTD = Personal Trusted Device
User identification 
Fig. 4. General service access architecture and operations
The goal of this paper is to present how the personal
information stored at the PTD can be used in traditional HTTP
based services. The architecture for personal information trans-
fer from a personal trusted device to a HTTP based service
consists of four physical parts (Figure 4) User, personal trusted
device (PTD), service accessing device (SAD) and the service.
The service itself can be any type of service provided in the
Internet. SAD is used by the user to connect to the service
and is usually a desktop or a laptop computer. The PTD that
contains the personal information is owned by the user and in
general it can be a PDA or a mobile phone.
Figure 4 shows the basic operations and parts of the system.
The general process of service usage where personal informa-
tion is accessed from PTD can be divided into 5 phases.
1) The user connects to the Internet service with the SAD
by using generic Internet protocols such as HTTP.
2) The service requests personalization information from
the SAD.
3) SAD connects to the PTD.
4) PTD transfers the requested information to the SAD.
5) SAD forwards the information to the service.
Depending on the type of information that is transferred, user
action might be required between steps three and four. User
action ensures that sensitive information, such as credit card
numbers, is not transmitted without the user’s consent. The
privacy aspects have to be taken into account before the actual
communication procedures are defined in more detail. If the
user identity is required by the service, PTD may be used as
an authentication token. The authentication credentials can be
transmitted through the same route as personal information.
IV. PERSONAL INFORMATION AND PRIVACY
From a privacy point of view, different pieces of personal
information vary from each other. There exists identifying
information such as a real name or address that reveals
the person’s identity and thus may provide risk towards the
privacy. Then there is the general preference information such
as preferred type of sports, which alone does not reveal the
identity, but can be used for service personalisation. The
difference in the sensitiveness of the data should affect also
on the handling of such data.
In the PTD based approach the data is stored at the user’s
PTD, from where it is fetched by the SAD when required.
From a usability point of view, the fetching of data should
happen automatically without extra effort from the user. On
the other hand sensitive data should not be transmitted without
the user’s consent. The decision what information is transmit-
ted automatically from PTD to SAD and which information
requires explicit approval, has to be done by the user. In our
model each piece of personal data has a security level attribute,
which is a value between 0 and 9. The bigger the value the
more sensitive is the data. This value is set by the user when
the data is added on the database of ME. This approach was
chosen to keep the system simple and understandable for the
user although hardcore network users may prefer more options
on configuration.
For each security level, the user can define what kind of
security measures have to be taken into account, before the
transaction of personal information can be committed. For ME,
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Service authentication means that before the personal infor-
mation is given, the service has to be authenticated as a
trusted service. From the communication architecture point of
view, three different grades of authentication can be identified.
On grade one, service authentication is not required and the
information is delivered to whoever requests it. On grade two,
the service authentication is done by the SAD which informs
the PTD about the service authentication. This approach is
useful when SAD is a trusted device, such as the user’s
personal computer, that is used frequently to access services.
Therefore, the SAD can be trusted to perform the service
authentication. When dealing with untrusted SAD, such as a
public computer, service authentication should be done by the
PTD. This grade three authentication requires that a service
certificate is stored at the PTD. Modern mobile phones and
PDA’s have enough memory to store the certificates and have
enough computation power to accomplish the authentication in
adequate time. In order to determine whether the used SAD is
actually trusted SAD, the PTD should hold certificates of the
trusted SADs. When the communication between SAD and
PTD is created authentication of the SAD should be executed.
From an encryption point of view, the transmission of per-
sonal information can be either considered to be between PTD
and the service or divided into two halves, namely SAD-PTD
and SAD-service communication links. Encryption between
the SAD and the service protects information eavesdropping
on Internet communications, while SAD-PTD communication
protects against local eavesdroppers. The encryption decision
for these links can be independent from each other. Often
the used service is accessed by using secure HTTP, where
all the transmitted data is encrypted. When requesting the
personal information, SAD should inform the PTD about the
used encryption algorithm and the key size. This information
provides the base for the PTD to decide whether the encryption
is adequate for data to be sent. For SAD-PTD communica-
tion, wireless communication standards e.g. Bluetooth, have
encryption mechanisms specified in them. ME can then decide
whether the included encryption method is secure enough.
When the encryption between separate links is not enough,
encryption has to be implemented between the PTD and the
service. Such an approach also prevents the SAD from eaves-
droping personal information and is therefore recommended
when the SAD cannot be trusted, e.g. when the service is
accessed from a public computer at the library. Encryption
between SAD and PTD requires encryption key exchange that
will add some overhead to the actual communication and some
complexity to the communication model.
User interaction means that the user explicitly expresses,
by pressing the appropriate buttons on PTD, whether the
given piece of information can be sent to the service or if
transaction should be cancelled. In order to keep the service
personalization as transparent as possible, the user interactions
should be minimized. Therefore, only the most important
information at highest security level, such as the credit card
number, should require explicit user confirmation. Since the
user might trust more on some services than others, the
requirement for the explicit user action can be defined for
each service separately. Just like the case with the personal
information, also the services have appropriate security levels
attached. The personal information, that has a lower or equal
level than the level of service, may be sent without the user’s
explicit approval.
The used security methods are decided by the PTD and are
based on the definitions made by the user at the configuration
stage. For example, the user might require that for level
4 information the service has to be authenticated and the
transmission should have at least a 128-bit encryption, while
for level 5, a 256-bit encryption is required.
A lot of the privacy related research concentrates on defining
the level of the user identity. In his PhD thesis Goldberg
called these levels as nymities starting from verinymity where
the user’s real identity is known to real anonymity where
nothing is known about the user’s identity [21]. Several
research projects such as DAIDALOS [22], Mobilife [23]
and PRIME [24] have defined ways of handling a variety of
pseudonyms the user may have when using different types of
services. In our approach the user identity and nymity is not
considered. User authentication, whether with pseudonym or
real identity, is not conducted by ME. On the other hand, the
user preference information can be acquired by the service
even if the user has not been registered on the service. Thus
it is possible for the user to remain anonymous and still
gain the benefit from personalisation. For example, the user
may get recommendations about the book types he prefers
at the online bookstore without logging in. Once he finds
something interesting he may log in to the service and reveal
his identity to order the book. The user may not have even
used the given service beforehand and gain the personalised
recommendations anyway.
V. SERVICE USE AND COMMUNICATION
Let’s go back to the example in the beginning of the paper
where John was registering to the conference, but now he uses
our architecture. Figure 5 describes the messages and actions
required in such use. First John connects to the conference
webpage just like before: he types in the conference URL
and web browser then sends the request to the service. The
conference server provides a web page for registration, which
also contains a JavaScript that starts a plug-in program on
the browser. The plug-in program handles the communication
between the SAD and the PTD. It first forms the connection
to the PTD. If there are several devices providing the personal
information, John has to select his own PTD from a list. Then
the plug-in requests the required personal information from
PTD. Depending on the security settings John may have to
accept the transmission explicitly from his PTD. The plug-in
fills in the registration form with the acquired data. Finally
the data is sent to the service when John presses the send
registration button on the web page.
In order to determine, which part of the transmitted data
is the name and which part is the address, a notation for the
data is required. Unfortunately, personal information is marked
in various ways depending on the situation. Service providers
have their own proprietary ways to store it for their own use
as do web browsers [13]. E-commerce has its own model for
















Schema 1: Part of the schema for personal information
field names that is designed for e-commerce purposes [25]. For
contact information a vCard standard has been defined [26],
[27]. In addition, several independent projects have defined
XML based markup for the name and the address information
[28]. Unfortunately, none of these are widely adopted in
services so far. Also the aforementioned notations do not take
into account the privacy issues stated in previous chapter nor




















Fig. 5. Generic HTTP-based service access
To fulfill the needs of our approach we have developed a
simple XML schema for personal information (Schema 1). The
schema contains tag names for different personal information
pieces and a MESecLevel attribute that states the security level
of the given piece of information. The information is stored in
the PTD following the XML schema. The same tag names are
also used by the service when it requests personal information.
Thus when a request arrives, ME simply browses through
the DOM (Document Object Model) tree of the personal
information database to find a tag that is equal to the one
in the request.
To support our architecture, the conference organizer has to
make some changes in the registration webpage. First of all
there has to be a JavaScript code that starts the plug-in. Then
the tag attributes that state which field is for surname and
which is for address should follow the naming scheme of ME.
Although a lot of research is going on in the semantic web
research field for matching different notations to each other
using ontology languages, the current version of the plug-in
does not have such a possibility.
From the example above, it can be seen that the communica-
tion in our architecture can be separated in two separate parts:
Service-SAD and SAD-PTD. Since the service is accessed via
an HTTP protocol, the communication between the service and
SAD naturally relies on the HTTP too. The communication
between SAD and PTD is independent of the service access
protocol. Therefore, even if the service access method changes
from HTTP to another protocol, the defined SAD-PTD com-
munication protocol remains the same. On SAD, the SAD-
PTD communication is handled by a simple program such as
a web browser plug-in [29]. This enables the possibility to use
the method defined for personal information transfer between
the mobile device and the transparent service provided through
an ubiquitous network [30].
In our implementation Bluetooth wireless technology [31] is
used for the SAD-PTD communication. Bluetooth consumes
little power so that it can be used in mobile devices that
usually rely on battery power [32]. In addition to that, the
Bluetooth support on mobile devices is getting more common.
Therefore, it is very likely that in the future most users that
have a mobile device have also the Bluetooth communication
capability. Bluetooth supports a variety of protocols and their
use in different cases is defined in several profiles [33]. For
our implementation an OBEX protocol was selected due to its
simplicity. OBEX is also supported by the IrDA standard [34].
Therefore, the OBEX protocol stack is already implemented in
most of mobile devices that support infrared communications.
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A. Service-SAD communication
Communication between the service and the SAD is done
by using an HTTP protocol. The messages needed for the
personal information access, are encapsulated in the payload
of the HTTP messages. This requires additional functionality
to the SAD as well as the service, but allows the end user to
use already familiar ways to access the services.
Since plug-in is used for handling the communication
between SAD and PTD, it has to be activated by the HTML
document that the SAD requested from the service. The
activation is done by using JavaScript on the web page. The
actual request can be either part of the HTML document or a
parameter on the JavaScript that runs the plug-in.
In the HTML document approach the request is encoded
on the web page throuhg a distinguished field where ID is a
PERSONALISATION REQUEST. Plug-in can find this field
by browsing the DOM tree of the document. The field contains
a list of personalization information that the service requests. If
the HTML Document holds a form to be filled, the field names
on the form can be notated following the XML-schema for the
personalization information. This way the plug-in can check
the requested information from the field names. If the request
is delivered as a parameter the request is decoded right at
the SAD by the plug-in program. This is faster than browsing
through the DOM tree. Support for both ways for request,
helps the service providers to adapt the service to apply the
ME approach.
No matter which way the request is done, it consists of a list
of wanted personal information and optionally the certificate
of the service. The requested personal information field names
should match those that are defined in the XML schema for
personal information. These are then forwarded to the PTD.
The response to the service is encapsulated also in the
payload of the existing protocol message, such as HTTP
POST. The response may contain the requested information
as an whole, special code for providing reason for failure
not getting information or just part of the information and
explanation code. Again the personal information is tagged in
XML following the XML schema for the personal information
and is part of the response document.
B. SAD-PTD communication
The communication between the SAD and the PTD is
done in two separate steps. The first step is to discover the
Bluetooth devices that support ME (Figure 6). After discovery,
the retrieval of the personal information from PTD can be done
(Figure 7).
In first step, all the devices in the range of the SAD are
called via service discovery protocol (SDP) to find out devices
that support the ME service and therefore have the capability
to transmit personal information. SAD then shows all the
found devices on its screen, from where the user can select his
own PTD. PTD’s Bluetooth hardware address (BDADDR) can
also be stored in the user’s plug-in configuration file to avoid
the slow discovery process. After the correct Bluetooth device
is determined, the normal Bluetooth connection forming takes








Fig. 6. Forming SAD-PTD Bluetooth connection
SAD and the PTD, the PTD acts as an OBEX server and SAD
acts as an OBEX client. Now the SAD can request personal
information from the PTD.
Communication between the SAD and the PTD should
support the privacy options defined in section 3. Thus SAD has
to provide the necessary information about the used service as
well as the security status of the SAD-service connection. The
communication should be done with existing protocols such
















Fig. 7. Personal information retrieval from PTD by SAD
The personal information request consists of five fields: size
of service public key, service public key, authentication level,
encryption level and requested personal information fields.
These fields are separated from each other by a colon. If
SSL (Secure Sockets layer) communication is used the plug-in
can get the service’s public key from the browser’s database,
otherwise the key should be in the incoming web page. If
there is no public key available the size of the service public
key is 0 and the key file is left empty. The authentication level
defines whether the service is authenticated by the SAD or not.
Encryption level defines the size of the encryption key used
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for the symmetric encryption of the SAD-service connection.
If no encryption is used the encryption level is set to 0. In
practice this means that when SSL is used for service access,
authentication is set to 1 and the encryption level is bigger
than zero. When using OBEX the request is encoded in the
OBEX GET message.
For the personal information request there are two types
of responses: personalization response, which contains the
requested personal information and error response, which tells
the reason why the requested information was not delivered.
The reply is encoded as one object, which is sent to the SAD
in the OBEX response message.
VI. SECURITY RISKS
The targets for possible attackers in the architecture can
be divided into two groups: communication channels and
hardware. For communication between the SAD and the
service our architecture does not provide any real additional
security measures. PTD may conduct the authentication of the
service using the standard X.509 certificates and asymmetric
cryptography on behalf of the SAD. This approach is similar
to commonly used SSL connections
The connection between SAD and PTD can also be compro-
mised. There are several attacks developed against Bluetooth
connections that utilise the insecure implementation of the
Bluetooth stack on host devices [35], [36]. The short commu-
nication range of Bluetooth is not a valid security point either
as there has been developed a device called the bluesniper
rifle that can intercept a Bluetooth signal over kilometers of
distance [37]. Even though Bluetooth uses a strong encryption
algorithm it is possible to force connected devices to conduct
a new key exchange process and after that eavesdrop on
the communication[38]. Therefore, the connection has to be
secured at the application layer.
The hardware targets for attacker may be the PTD, service
or SAD. First of all the attacker may steal PTD and then take
the information out from it directly. To prevent direct data
theft from the device the user has to be authenticated before
the preferences data on the database can be read or edited.
An attacker may also try to pretend to be a trusted SAD or
service in order to acquire information from the device. Used
authentication methods based on asymmetric cryptography are
reliable as long as the public key transfer is conducted safely.
Man-in-the-middle attack during the keyexchange is a valid
thread. Using a public SAD for eavesdropping the personal
data transfer between the PTD and service can be prevented
by end-to-end security measures stated in Chapter 3.
Although these risks are real our architecture has also some
benefits from a security point of view. Attacking against the
PTD or the communication channel will only provide the
attacker information about one person. A service provider,
holding big databases about its customers, is a much more
attractive target to the criminal mind. Thus against an attacker
who wants to steal identities of hundreds of persons, our
architecture can be said to be more secure than existing
systems. On the other hand when the target is a single person
the advantage is not that clear. The more services the person
uses the bigger is the risk that one of them has a vulnerability
in their security system through which the personal data can
be stolen. Thus it can be stated that the more services used
the bigger the benefit, from a security point of view, for
architecture.
The current security measures provide basic security, but
the existing problems should be further researched. In that
research it should be kept in mind that the main goal of the
architecture is to add usability. Therefore the security methods
should be kept as transparent to the user as possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented an architecture for trans-
ferring personal information stored in a mobile device to the
Internet service. The mobile device as personal information
storage location provides advantages for information security.
Sensitive information is stored only at one place instead of
many places, which means that up keeping the information is
simple. The mobile device holds the information of only one
person, which makes the device less of an attractive target for
information thieves.
The information is available for any Internet service with
the user permission regardless of user registration. Thus the
usability of the services is enhanced as the users do not have to
type in repetitive information in every service. The approach
also enables the possibility to provide an anonymous user a
personalised view of the service. The used approach requires
little changes to the service itself as most of the work is done
by an external downloadable browser plug-in. Therefore, the
described approach can be applied in several existing services
with little cost.
Further research is required to define an effective user
interface for controlling personal information. User interface
research should answer the question on how the user can
easily define, which information can be acquired automatically
by services and which services are actually allowed to do
so. Additional research should be conducted on the security
issues of the data transfer. Furthermore, support for identity
management and pseudonyms should be researched.
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